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Abstract:  This essay surveys the literature on financial innovation from a wide variety 
of disciplines:  financial economics, history, law, and industrial organization.  I define 
financial innovation, discuss problems with creating taxonomies of financial innovation, 
and outline the explanations given for the extensive amount of financial innovation we 
observe both today and in history.  I also review work that studies the identity of 
innovators, the process of diffusion of innovation, the private benefits of innovation and 
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1.   Introduction 
In Merton Miller’s (1986) view on financial innovation, the period from the mid-
1960s to mid-1980s was a unique one in American financial history.  Looking backward, 
he rhetorically asked, “Can any twenty-year period in recorded history have witnessed 
even a tenth as much (financial innovation)?”  Looking forward, he asked the question, 
“Financial innovation: Is the great wave subsiding?”   Answering “No” to the first 
question and “Yes” to the second, he concluded that the period was an extraordinary one 
in the history of financial innovation.   However, with 20-20 hindsight, we can disagree 
with his assessment and answer the two questions somewhat differently.   
History shows that financial innovation has been a critical and persistent part of 
the economic landscape over the past few centuries  In the years since Miller’s 1986 
piece, financial markets have continued to produce a multitude of new products, 
including many new forms of derivatives, alternative risk transfer products, exchange 
traded funds, and variants of tax-deductible equity.  A longer view suggests that financial 
innovation—like innovation elsewhere in business—is an ongoing process whereby 
private parties experiment to try to differentiate their products and services, responding to 
both sudden and gradual changes in the economy.  Surely, innovation ebbs and flows 
with some periods exhibiting bursts of activity and others witnessing a slackening or even 
backlash.
1  However, when seen from a distance, the Schumpeterian process of 
                                                           
1 For example, there have been numerous periods throughout the past centuries in which innovation 
flourished, failures took place, and public and regulatory sentiment led to temporary anti-innovation 
feelings.  See Chancellor (1999).  More recently, the failure of Enron has probably slowed the innovation 
of new forms of special purpose entities and off-balance sheet financing, although this chilling effect is 
unlikely to be permanent. 3 
innovation—in this instance, financial innovation—is a regular ongoing part of a profit-
maximizing economy. 
In this review piece, I summarize the existing research on financial innovation 
and highlight the many areas where our knowledge is still very incomplete.  The existing 
work, while fairly modest in scope relative to others topics covered in this volume, is 
spread over a wide range of fields:  general equilibrium analyses of the role for financial 
innovation; thought pieces proposing the reasons for innovation; legal and policy 
analyses of tax rules, regulation and innovation; studies of financial innovation in the 
industrial organization literature; clinical studies of individual innovations: and a handful 
of empirical studies of the process of innovation.
2   A number of comprehensive books on 
the subject have been written, including Allen and Gale’s (1994) comprehensive 
overview, and entire issues of journals have been devoted to the topic (e.g., Journal of 
Economic Theory (1995, Volume 65.))  The topic of financial innovation has been 
addressed by a number of AFA presidents, including Merton, Miller, Ross and Van 
Horne, some in their Presidential Addresses.  My goals in this short overview are to cover 
the breadth of the existing literature briefly, rather than treat one sub-area in detail, and to 
highlight open issues that researchers may find suitable for future work. 
This piece is divided into five sections.  The first defines financial innovation and 
discusses the difficulty of creating a taxonomy of financial innovations.  The second 
section discusses the explanations advanced for financial innovation.  The third section 
discusses the identity of innovators.  The fourth section discusses the implications of 
                                                           
2 In addition, there are a variety of a large number of articles in the financial press as well as popular 
business books addressing the topic of financial innovation, typically from the perspective of how 
businesses can capitalize on them.  For examples of popular book-length discussions of financial 
innovation, see Geanuracos and Millar (1991), Walmsley (1988) and Crawford and Sen (1996). 4 
financial innovation on private and social wealth.  The final section concludes with a 
brief discussion of new means of protecting the intellectual property of innovators and a 
review of the open issues in this field. 
 
2.  What is financial innovation? 
Much of the theoretical and empirical work in financial economics considers a 
highly stylized world in which there are few types of securities (debt and equity, perhaps) 
and maybe a handful of simple financial institutions (banks or exchanges.)  However, in 
reality there is a vast range of different financial products, many different types of 
financial institutions and a variety of processes that these institutions employ to do 
business.  The literature on financial innovation attempts to catalog some of this variety, 
describe the reasons why we observe an ever-increasing diversity of practice, and assess 
the private and social implications of this activity. 
  “Innovate” is defined in Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary as “to introduce as or as 
if new,”
3 with the root of the word deriving from the Latin word “novus” or new.   
Economists use the word “innovation” in an expansive fashion to describe shocks to the 
economy (e.g., “monetary policy innovations”) as well as the responses to these shocks 
(e.g., Eurodeposits).  Broadly speaking, financial innovation is the act of creating and 
then popularizing new financial instruments as well as new financial technologies, 
institutions and markets.   The “innovations” are sometimes divided into product or 
process innovation, with product innovations exemplified by new derivative contracts, 
new corporate securities or new forms of pooled investment products, and process 
improvements typified by new means of distributing securities, processing transactions, 5 
or pricing transactions.  In practice, even this innocuous differentiation is not clear, as 
process and product innovation is often linked.  The processes by which one creates a 
new index linked to college costs or invests to produce returns that replicate this index 
are hard to separate from a new indexed investment product that tries to help parents save 
to pay for their children’s education. 
Innovation includes the acts of invention (the ongoing research and development 
function) and diffusion (or adoption) of new products, services or ideas.
4   Invention is 
probably an overly generous term, in that most innovations are evolutionary adaptations 
of prior products.  The lexicographer’s addition of the phrase “as if” to the definition of 
innovation reflects one difficulty in any study of this phenomenon—almost nothing is 
completely “new” and the degree of newness or novelty is inherently subjective.
5 (Patent 
examiners charged with judging the novelty of inventions face this challenge routinely.)   
  One sub-branch of the literature on financial innovation has created lists or 
taxonomies of innovations.  Given the breadth of possible innovations, this work tends to 
specialize in particular areas, such as securities innovations.  For example, Finnerty 
(1988, 1992, 2001) has created a list of over 60 securities innovations, organized by 
broad type of instrument (debt, preferred stock, convertible securities, and common 
equities) and by the function served (reallocating risk, increasing liquidity, reducing 
agency costs, reducing transactions costs, reducing taxes or circumventing regulatory 
constraints.)    One investment bank published a guide to innovative international debt 
securities in the mid-1980s. This 64-page booklet did not describe individual innovations, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1988). 
4 See Rogers (1983) for a discussion of the adoption of innovations. 6 
but rather categorized the characteristics of the innovative securities along five 
dimensions (coupon, life, redemption proceeds, issue price and warrants.)
6    
Neither innovation nor the impulse to categorize it are new activities:  The 1934 
edition of the investing classic, Benjamin Graham and David Dodd's Security Analysis 
included an appendix entitled "A Partial List of Securities which Deviate from the 
Normal Patterns," which they introduced in this way: 
In assembling the material presented herewith it has not been our purpose to 
present a complete list of all types of securities which vary from the customary 
contractual arrangements between the issuing corporation and the holder. Such a 
list would extend the size of this volume beyond reasonable limits. We have, 
however, attempted to give a reasonably complete example of deviations from the 
standard patterns. 
 
In the following 17 pages, they described 258 securities. Put in modern language, their 
list included pay-in-kind bonds, step-up bonds, putable bonds, bonds with stock 
dividends, zero coupon bonds, inflation-indexed bonds, a variety of exotic convertible 
and exchangeable bonds, 23 different types of warrants, voting bonds, non-voting shares, 
and a host of other instruments.   Graham and Dodd’s list is not an anomaly.  A small 
literature on the history of financial innovation demonstrates that the creation of new 
financial products and processes has been an ongoing part of economies for at least the 
past four centuries, if not longer.
7  While many of these old innovations sound quite new 
even today, some have become extinct.  For example, the “Million Adventure,” described 
by Allen and Gale (1994, p. 13) raised one million pounds in 1694.  The structure of this 
“lottery loan” innovation was a 16 year bond paying 10% with an added bonus—a lottery 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 Scholars in Industrial Organization sometimes differentiate between “drastic” and “incremental” 
innovations.  Drastic innovations bring costs to a level below the corresponding monopoly price.  See 
Tirole (1988, chapter 10). 
6 Other useful lists were drawn up by Tufano (1989, 1995), Matthews (1994) and Silber (1975). 
7 For extended discussions, see Silber (1975), Allen and Gale (1994, Chapter 2) and Tufano (1995, 1997). 7 
ticket which gave the holder a chance to share in an additional £40,000 per year for each 
of the next 16 years.   
In preparing this chapter, I asked my research assistant to compile a complete list 
of security innovations so that I could update an estimate from the mid-80s that showed 
that 20% of all new security issues used an “innovative” structure.
8   One place to begin 
this exercise was Thompson Financial Securities Data (former SDC), a data vendor that 
tracks new public offerings of securities.  He provided me with a list of 1,836 unique 
“security codes” used from the early 1980s through early 2001, each purporting to be a 
different type of security.  Some of the securities listed were nearly-identical products 
offered by banks trying to differentiate their wares from those of their competitors.  
Others represented evolutionary improvements on earlier products.  Perhaps a few were 
truly novel.  Nevertheless, the length of the list represents a “normal” pattern of financial 
innovation, where a security is created, but then modified (and improved) slightly by 
each successive bank that offers it to its clients.   
Even this list—if combed to eliminate false innovation—would severely 
underestimate the amount of financial innovation, as it only includes corporate securities.  
It excludes the tremendous innovation in exchange-traded derivatives, over-the-counter 
derivative contracts
9 (such as the credit derivatives, equity swaps, weather derivatives 
and exotic over-the-counter options), new insurance contracts (such as alternative risk 
transfer contracts or contingent equity contracts), and new investment management 
products (such as folioFN or exchange traded funds.)    
                                                           
8 The original estimate comes form Tufano (1989). 
9 Duffie and Rahi (1995) cite the Wall Street Journal (June 14, 1994), p. C1 as stating there are over 1200 
different types of derivative securities in use, although these journalistic calculations are somewhat suspect. 8 
  The many different “lists” of financial innovations—even just security 
innovations—demonstrate the difficulty in categorizing new products.   Lists organized 
by product name (like SDC’s categorization) tend to be uninformative, because firms use 
names to differentiate similar products.   Lists by “traditional labels” (e.g., legal or 
regulatory definitions of debt or equity, etc.) tend to be problematic, as innovations often 
intentionally span across different traditional labels.   Lists organized by product feature 
(e.g., maturity, redemption provisions, etc.) provide a great deal of information and 
highlight the component parts of each innovation, but do so at creating a classification 
system that has so many dimensions as to be unmanageable.   
The alternative chosen by most academics writing about innovation has been to 
adopt a functional approach to classifying products.
10  Rather than group products by 
their names or features, authors categorize them by the functions they serve.  Finnerty’s 
taxonomy mentioned above does this, as does The Bank for International Settlements  
(BIS, 1986).  The BIS discusses the problems with creating taxonomies and concludes 
that the best scheme is a functional one.  While there seems to be some agreement that 
the best categorization scheme is a functional one, it is less clear how to identify the 
particular functions. 
 
3.   Why do financial innovations arise?  What function do they serve? 
  If the world were free of all “imperfections”—such as taxes, regulation, 
information asymmetries, transaction costs, and moral hazard—and if markets were 
complete in the sense that existing securities spanned all states of nature, we could arrive 9 
at an M&M-like corollary regarding financial innovation.  Financial innovations would 
benefit neither private parties nor society and would simply be neutral mutations.
11    
Against this backdrop, a sizeable body of literature attempts to understand how 
various “imperfections” (and changes in these imperfections) stimulate financial 
innovation.  These imperfections prevent participants in the economy from efficiently 
obtaining the functions they need from the financial system.  Generally, authors establish 
how financial innovations are optimal responses to various basic problem or 
opportunities, such as incomplete markets that prevent risk shifting or asymmetric 
information.  Some of these analyses are “institution-free” in that they do not explicitly 
consider the role of innovators in the process, while other institutionally-grounded 
explanations study the parts played by financial institutions using innovation to compete.   
  What functions do innovations help us perform?  Merton’s (1992) functional 
decomposition identifies six functions delivered by financial systems: (1) moving funds 
across time and space; (2) the pooling of funds; (3) managing risk; (4) extracting 
information to support decision-making; (5) addressing moral hazard and asymmetric 
information problems; and (6) facilitating the sale of purchase of goods and services 
through a payment system.   Different writers use slightly different lists of functions, but 
there is much overlap in these descriptions.   For example, Finnerty (1992) identifies a set 
of functions, two of which correspond closely to Merton’s functions (reallocating risk 
and reducing agency costs), and a third (“increasing liquidity”) which is an amalgam of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 While various authors have proposed functional classification schemes, the broader notion of using 
“function” as the critical unit in understanding financial systems has been advanced strongly by Merton 
(1992), and is developed in Crane et al. (1995). 
11 While the notion of neutral mutations has been long recognized in evolution, Miller (1977) used the term 
to describe a variety of financial decisions and financial innovations.  While this term is normally used as a 
derogatory one, Miller is careful to note that the existence of seemingly neutral mutations can “permit the 10 
Merton’s movement of funds and pooling functions.   The BIS (1986) has a slightly 
different scheme to identify the functions performed by innovation, focusing on the 
transfer of risks (both price and credit), the enhancement of liquidity, and the generation 
of funds to support enterprises (through credit and equity.)   Each author strives to 
describe the functions in a parsimonious fashion, but it is probably fair to say that no 
commonly accepted and unique taxonomy of functions has been adopted.  Even if it were 
to exist, no functional scheme could avoid the complication that a single innovation is 
likely to address multiple functions.  For example, using Merton’s functional scheme, 
asset securitization invokes at least three functions: it pools various future promises, 
modifies risk profiles through diversification, and moves funds across time and space.   
If functions represent timeless demands put upon financial systems, then why do we 
observe innovation?    Some authors adopt a static framework, where no attempt is made 
to explain the timing of the innovation.  Other authors adopt a dynamic framework, 
where innovations reflect responses to changes in the environment, and the timing of the 
innovation mirrors this change.  My discussion below summarizes most of the key 
arguments, and uses a combination of recent and historical examples to illustrate the 
points.
12   
(1) Innovation exists to complete inherently incomplete markets.  In an incomplete 
market, not all states of nature can be spanned, and as a result, parties are not able to 
move funds freely across time and space, nor to manage risk.    Duffie and Rahi (1995), 
in their introduction to a special issue of the Journal of Economic Theory on financial 
market innovation and security design, review the literature on market incompleteness 
                                                                                                                                                                             
adaptation to new conditions to take place more quickly or surely” in response to real changes in the 
economy.    11 
and innovation.
13   This literature attempts to establish conditions under which innovation 
would occur in equilibrium.  In summarizing a wide range of the literature they conclude: 
At this early stage, while there are several results providing conditions for the 
existence of equilibrium with innovation, the available theory has relatively few 
normative or predictive results.  From a spanning point of view, we can guess that 
there are incentives to set up markets for securities for which there are no close 
substitutes, and which may be used to hedge substantive risks. 
 
This theoretical proposition is consistent with evidence of the pattern of 
innovation in exchange-traded contracts documented by Black (1986).  She shows a 
relationship between a new contract’s viability (measured by its trading volume) and its 
ability to complete markets (measured by its lack of correlation with large but 
uninsurable risks.)  Grinblatt and Longstaff (2000) study a different innovation (Treasury 
STRIPS or zero-coupon bonds).   They find that investors create new STRIPS primarily 
to make markets more complete, a conclusion drawn from the observation that STRIPS 
are created when it would be most difficult to synthesize the discount bonds from existing 
coupon instruments. 
Allen and Gale (1988) consider a particular form of market incompleteness—in 
the form of short sales restrictions—as motivation for innovation by parties seeking to 
share risk.  They show it may be optimal for firms to offer multiple classes of claims 
(“breaking the firm into pieces”) generating value from different investor preferences and 
needs (“selling the pieces to the clientele that values it most.”)   
Cloaked in less academic language, the idea that innovation typically address the 
unmet preferences or needs of particular clienteles is reasonably well discussed in 
business practice.    For example, one popular book describing the derivatives activities at 
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 Portions of this section are drawn from Tufano (1992). 12 
a major bank (Partnoy (1997)) provides details on relatively uncommon products 
designed for a small number of institutional investors. 
(2) Innovation persists to address inherent agency concerns and information 
asymmetries:  Much of contracting theory (or the security design literature) explores how 
contracts can be written to better align the interests of different parties or to force the 
revelation of private information by managers.  This extensive literature has been 
surveyed by Harris and Raviv (1989), and is also covered in Allen and Gale (1994, pp. 
140-147).  Persistent conflicts of interest between outside capital providers and self-
interested managers, and asymmetric information between informed insiders and 
uniformed outsiders, leads to equilibria in which firms issue a multiplicity of securities.  
Most of this work deals with innovation in a fairly limited sense, explaining the existence 
of a few contracts like debt or equity, not scores of different types of corporate securities.  
However, Haugen and Senbett (1981) argue that incorporating embedded options into 
securities can mitigate moral hazard problems.  This motive for innovation can possibly 
explain the embedded options in some innovative R&D financings (for a case study of 
these innovations, see Lerner and Tufano (1993)
 14 and for an empirical analysis see 
Beatty, Berger and Magliolo (1995)).  In these structures, an R&D financing organization 
is set up with separate shareholders from the “parent,” which retains all decision rights to 
the day-to-day activities of this separate organization.  Attaching warrants exerciseable 
into the stock of the “parent” of the R&D financing vehicles partially ameliorates the 
inherent conflicts of interest. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
13 Duffie and Rahi (1995)’s survey describes a unified modeling framework to study the impact of 
innovation on risk-sharing and information aggregation. 
14 This case study and others mentioned here are also in Mason, Merton, Perold and Tufano (1995) 13 
Ross (1989) invokes agency issues to explains some financial innovations.  He 
notes that agency considerations make borrowing costly or limited and, as a result, 
individuals contract with opaque financial institutions.   When a shock (such as a change 
in taxes or regulation) occurs, financial intermediaries may find it efficient to sell off 
low-grade assets.  Because outside investors cannot easily assess the value of these 
assets, the institutions turn to investment banks to place these securities with their 
network of clients.  These investment banks innovate, creating new pools of these low-
grade assets.  Agency considerations interact with marketing costs to produce innovation. 
  Throughout history, information asymmetries have prompted a number of 
innovations.   Throughout much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, firms 
disclosed very little credible financial information.  Over time, market forces and 
governmental action materially increased the quantity and quality—and thus lowered the 
cost—of information about firms.  Early innovations tended to substitute for (or 
economize on) the use of costly information, while later innovations capitalized on its 
lower cost. One of the earliest innovations, the nineteenth century practice of issuing 
assessable stock, provided some mechanisms to squeeze information from firms. An 
assessable share-holder committed to supply a certain amount of money to the firm, but 
doled out the cash to the firm in response to regular assessments. (Dewing (1919). Issuers 
of assessable common stock were forced to return to their investors regularly and make 
the case for continued commitment, because each investor held the option to fail to make 
the assessment and forfeit his interest.  The nineteenth century firms' almost complete 
reliance on secured debt for debt financing (see Ripley cited in Baskin (1988, pp. 14 
215-216)) may also be interpreted as a costly contracting choice that substituted for more 
precise monitoring prevented by inadequate disclosure.  
  Later nineteenth century innovations took advantage of the presence of cheaper 
and more reliable information. Later preferred stocks conditioned their holders' voting 
rights on firms' failure to comply with covenant terms (Johnson (1925) and Wilson 
(1930), both cited in Dewing (1934)). These covenants, especially after 1900, were more 
likely to be tied to financial ratios, as were bond covenants keyed to working capital tests 
or asset maintenance tests (Dewing (1934)). Finally, income bonds, popularized in the 
late nineteenth century, were completely linked to the availability of accounting 
information. These unsecured obligations required issuers to pay interest only if the firm 
earned positive accounting profits in the current period. This early history shows how 
innovations were a response to information asymmetries.  Certain innovations forced the 
revelation of information and others exploited the low cost information generated through 
other processes.    
   (3)  Innovation exists so parties can minimize transaction, search or marketing 
costs.    Merton (1989) discusses how the presence of transaction costs provides a critical 
role for financial intermediaries.  Financial intermediaries permit households facing 
transaction costs to achieve their optimal consumption-investment program.  Merton uses 
this argument to explain how equity swaps can be an efficient way to deliver returns to 
multinational investors.  A similar explanation is invoked by McConnell and Schwartz 
(1992) who provide a clinical study of one particular innovation, LYONS (liquid yield 
option notes).  Lee Cole, the Options Marketing Manager at Merrill Lynch noticed that 
retail investors tended to place most of their money in low-risk securities and then buy a 15 
series of call options.  Merrill Lynch’s LYONs allowed investors to replicate this payoff 
without having to incur the commission costs of rolling over their call option positions at 
least four times a year.   
Many of the process innovations in payment systems technologies are aimed at 
lowering transaction costs.   ATMs, smart cards, ACH technologies, e-401k programs 
and many other new businesses are legitimate financial innovations that seek to 
dramatically lower the sheer costs of processing transactions.  By some estimates, these 
innovations have the potential to lower the cost of transacting by a factor of over 100.  
For example, by one estimate, a teller-assisted transaction costs over $1.00 and the same 
transaction executed over the Internet would cost about $0.01.
15 
 New businesses like Instinet, Open-IPO, Enron OnLine, Ebay, or the host of B-
to-B exchanges are innovations that aimed at lowering the transaction costs faced by 
buyers and sellers.  These transaction costs are search or marketing costs, which can 
include a variety of components—the sheer costs of identifying buyers and seller, 
information costs, and transaction costs of order processing.  Ross’s (1989) analysis of 
securitization keys off the expensive process of marketing in conjunction with agency 
considerations.  Madan and Soubra (1991) examine how financial intermediaries attempt 
to maximize their revenues net of marketing costs, which leads them to design multiple 
products that appeal to wider sets of investors.  
History shows that as marketing costs fall, financial innovations exploit the easier 
access to buyers and sellers of securities. For example, during World War I, the U.S. 
government instituted a massive program to fund its war-time efforts through selling 
                                                           
15 The Economist, “Online Finance Survey,” May 20, 2000. Page 20 16 
small-denomination bonds to individual investors. Carosso (1970) describes the Liberty 
Loan program of 1917 which identified and educated a new clientele of retail investors: 
The Treasury immediately decided to mount an intensive nationwide sales effort. 
Advertisements and thousands of spokesmen emphasized the security, high yield, 
and probable appreciation of the new Liberty bonds. Established techniques were 
put aside. Instead of selling substantial amounts of large denominations for 
holding in relatively few hands, the government issued bonds in small 
denominations, utilized war saving stamps widely, and permitted installment 
payments. All the foregoing "new" departures were designed to appeal to 
individuals not considered potential investors since the Civil War days of Jay 
Cooke. 
 
  These activities by the federal government lowered the costs for the private sector 
to identify and educate new potential customers. After the war, innovations in the private 
sector took advantage of the lowered costs of raising funds from households. These 
innovations, tailored to meet the needs of small savers, included "baby bonds" sold in 
small denominations and securities sales on installment (Riegel (1920)).  
  (4) Innovation is a response to taxes and regulation:  While many authors have 
pointed out the link between taxes and innovation, Miller (1986) is often cited on this 
point: “The major impulses to successful innovations over the past twenty years have 
come, I am saddened to have to say, from regulation and taxes.”  The list of tax and 
regulatory induced products would include zero coupon bonds, Eurodollar Eurbonds, 
various equity-linked structures used to monetize asset holdings without triggering 
immediate capital gains taxes, and trust preferred structures.
16    
  If we think of taxes as a major “imperfection” added to the M&M world, then the 
search to maximize after-tax returns has arguably stimulated much innovation, and 
changes in tax law in turn stimulate even more innovation.  For example, various equity-
linked structures used by firms to monetize their holdings of stock permit these firms to 17 
delay paying capital gains taxes.  These innovations decouple economic ownership or 
exposure from legal ownership (governance and tax implications.)  See Tufano (1997b) 
and Santangelo and Tufano (1997) for a case study of this type of innovation.   
  A number of legal scholars have written extensively on the relationship between 
laws and innovation, and have created a flourishing literature on this subject.  They 
discuss how tax laws have both encouraged and discouraged innovation, analyzed the 
failures of the U.S. tax code for dealing with functionally-similar securities, suggested 
how to change the tax code to eliminate innovation, and given their opinions of the social 
welfare costs of tax-induced innovation.
17    
A century ago, taxes were a less visible force in the U.S. economy, yet they still 
played some role in the process of financial innovation. In the late 1920s, a few states 
(Delaware, New Jersey, and New York) began to levy incorporation and transfer taxes 
based on the par value of firms' shares, and to assign par values of $100 to firms whose 
stock had zero par value. Corporations almost immediately reissued shares with small, 
but nonzero ($1-$5) par values (Hornberger (1933)). Equipment trust certificates, by 
which a railroad leased cars from a manufacturer with financing provided by the 
certificates secured by the equipment, were more popular in states such as Pennsylvania 
that subjected bonds, but not the certificates, to income taxes (Dewing (1934)). 
  Changes in regulation are also credited with stimulating innovation.  Kane (1986) 
identified what he calls the “regulatory dialectic” as a major source of innovation.  
Innovation responds to regulatory constraints, which in turn are adjusted in reaction to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 For an example of this type of innovation for zero coupon debt, see Fisher, Brick and Ng  (1983). 
17 This is a very extensive literature.  For representative papers, see Gergen and  Schmitz (1997), 
Kollbrenner (1995), Warren (1993), Knoll (1997, 2001) Strnad (1994), Schenk, D. H., (1995).  
  18 
these innovations.   Bank capital requirements are a good example of regulations that 
impose costs on the affected parties, who then use innovation to optimize in light of these 
constraints.   Capital notes and certain preferred stocks that qualified as “capital” to bank 
regulators are examples of regulatory-induced innovation.  Similarly, the early Eurobond 
market was motivated by regulatory concerns. By offering Eurodollar CDs, U.S. banks, 
led by Citicorp in 1966, sought to circumvent reserve requirements to stem the painful 
disintermediation they were experiencing.
18   Regulations limiting cross-border flows are 
sometimes credited with stimulating certain equity swaps, which enable foreign investors 
to hold an economic interest in equities they would find difficult to own.
19  The academic 
debate on regulation has taken many different forms: Whether regulation has stimulated 
or impeded innovation and whether regulation is “sensible” in light of innovation.  See 
White (2000), Hu (1989), Pouncy (1998), and Russo and Vinciguerra (1991) for 
development of some of these themes.   While regulation is considered a key driver of 
innovation, Jagtaiani, Saunders and Udell (1995) fail to find that changes in capital 
requirements consistently affected the speed of adoption of certain innovations, like off-
balance sheet products. 
While ratings agencies are not governmentally-established regulators, they are a 
form of self-regulatory organization.  Their rules have given rise to innovations.  In 
particular, various forms of trust preferred securities that seek to retain tax deductibility 
while being treated like equity from the perspective of ratings agencies are examples of 
innovation induced partially by ratings. 
                                                           
18 Eurobond markets were also stimulated by related concerns, although more linked to tax considerations.  
See Kim and Stulz (1988). 
19 Regulation or lack of certain standard legal forms can also stymie innovation.  For example, various laws 
have apparently slowed the growth of securitization in some European countries.   19 
  Court decisions, and the nature of the legal system, gives rise to innovation.  
Throughout the late nineteenth century, the extreme business cycles experienced by the 
U.S. economy led to the massive failures of railroads and industrial firms. Security 
holders turned to the courts to enforce what they believed to be their legal rights, but 
judges set aside many "inviolable rights" to quickly reorganize the railroads. Specifically, 
super-senior "debtor-in-possession" financing was given priority above existing senior 
claimants, certain unsecured creditors were paid before secured creditors, and judges set 
“judicial” values for the claims of distressed firms. These legal innovations were 
important stimuli for the adoption of contingent charge securities and voting trusts, which 
supplanted traditional creditors' rights with more direct means of monitoring and control.  
See Tufano (1997).  Franks and Sussman (1999) argue that the nature of the “innovation 
regime” (whether driven by lenders and borrowers, or by judges and legislators) affects 
the nature of subsequent contract evolution and the amount of innovation.   
  Just as governmental or court rules can give rise to innovation, so too can 
religious prohibitions.  The strong Islamic prohibition against interest has stimulated a 
number of alternative financing vehicles.  Many of these innovations seem to respect the 
letter, but not the spirit, of the ban on interest, using sale-repurchase contracts to 
effectively deliver interest to lenders.  For a discussion, see Vogel and Hayes (1998).   
It may be more than semantics to comment that legal engineering has facilitated a 
range of new forms of contracting innovations.  For example, the on-going quest for “tax-
deductible equity” has largely been the product of legal engineers utilizing new ideas to 
develop securities who cash payments are tax-deductible but which are treated like equity 
in the eyes of potential investors.  McLaughlin (2000) discusses the relationship between 20 
legal engineering and financial innovation from the perspective of a practicing member of 
the legal bar.   
(5) Increasing globalization and risk motivate innovation.  Most essays on 
financial innovation identify globalization and increasing volatility as drivers of 
innovation.  With greater globalization, firms, investors and governments are exposed to 
new risks (exchange rates or political risks), and innovations help them manage these 
risks.  For example, a recent  press report announced that the Interamerican Development 
Bank had created the first-ever instrument that incorporated a currency convertibility and 
transferability guarantee.   In addition, globalization enables capital raisers to tap larger 
and more diverse populations of potential investors.  A variety of innovations are 
attributed to attempts to meet the needs of specific investor clienteles.  For example, one 
popular finance book describes a variety of innovative structures designed to appeal to 
particular Japanese insurance company investors, a form of cross-national regulatory 
arbitrage. 
  Some authors point to increasing volatility as a stimulus to innovation.   For 
example, Smith, Smithson, and Wilford (1990. p. 13) document the increase in the 
volatility of interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices, and draw a link 
between this increase in riskiness and financial innovation: 
Uncertainty in the global financial environment has caused many economic 
problems and disruptions, but it has also provided the impetus for financial 
innovation. Through financial innovation, the financial intermediaries were soon 
able to offer their customers products to manage or even exploit the new risks. 
Through this same innovation, financial institutions became even better able to 
evaluate and manage their own asset and liability processes. 
 
They list a variety of innovations spawned by increasing volatility: foreign exchange 
futures, swaps and options; interest-rate futures, swaps, options, and forwards; and 21 
commodity swaps, futures, and options.  As a concrete example, the deregulation of 
natural gas in the United States suddenly exposed producers and consumers of gas with 
tremendous volatility.  Drawing analogies to financial markets, gas marketers created (or 
adapted) a variety of new gas contracts, including Volumetric Production Payment 
contracts, cross-commodity swaps, and a line of branded price protection products.  See 
Mason, Merton, Perold and Tufano (1995). 
  The volatility of exchange rates and inflation rates prompted earlier innovations. 
The period of World War I and its aftermath was characterized by high inflation 
uncertainty. "Stabilized" (inflation-indexed) bonds, which were introduced in 1925 with 
an issue by Rand-Kardex, linked interest and principal payments to the wholesale price 
index (Masson and Stratton (1938)). This innovation, although apparently never 
popularized, was an explicit attempt to solve the problem of volatile prices. The 
instability of currency values prompted innovations regarding the medium of payment for 
bonds (currency-choice bonds). "Legal tender" bonds gave "the payer ... the option of 
paying in any kind of legal tender (gold, silver, or currency); they give to him the benefit 
of the cheaper form of currency" (Cleveland (1920)). Non-U.S. issuers, facing the 
problems of "disordered or unstable monetary systems...attempted to allay the fears of 
investors by various attempts to insure protection against depreciated currencies." These 
innovations included indexing payments to exchange rates and permitting investors to 
choose the form of the interest payment (Masson and Stratton (1938)).  Stabilized and 
currency-choice bonds show that volatility motivated innovations in the 1830-1930 
period, just as it has spurred more recent innovation.  22 
(6) Technological shocks stimulate innovation:  Shocks to technology are thought to 
provide a “supply-side” explanation for the timing of some innovations.
20   Advances in 
information technology support sophisticated pooling schemes that we observe in 
securitization.  IT and improvements in telecommunications (and more recently the 
Internet) has facilitated a number of innovations (not all successful), including new 
methods of underwriting securities (e.g., OpenIPO), new methods of assembling 
portfolios of stocks (folioFN), new markets for securities and  new means of executing 
security transactions. White (2000) articulates this technological view of financial 
innovation. 
New “intellectual technologies,” i.e., derivative pricing models, are credited with 
stimulating the growth and popularization of a variety of new contracts.  Many new 
forms of derivatives were made possible because business people could have some 
confidence in the methods of pricing and hedging the risks of these new contracts.  
Without the ideas developed by Black, Scholes, Merton and many others, many 
developments in derivative products would probably never have occurred. 
Various forms of innovations such as new risk management systems and measures 
(such as Value-at-Risk based measures), on-line retirement planning services (like 
Financial Engines), and new valuation techniques (like real options) clearly were 
facilitated by both intellectual and information technology innovations.  For example, the 
existence of lifetime portfolio choice models, developments in numerical analyses and 
simulation, hardware that enables faster processing, and the Internet are all elements that 
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of innovations. 23 
support (but may not ensure the success of) new businesses like that seek to provide 
consumers with advice on their financial decisions. 
 
A case study:  No one explanation works.   Let us consider a quarter century of 
innovation in one particular part of the investment management world, and how virtually 
every stimulus mentioned above played a role in a whole family of innovations. 
In their 1974 piece, “From Theory to a New Financial Product,” Black and 
Scholes describe the birth of a new product:“market funds,” or what we call today index 
funds.  Wells Fargo reportedly first offered a privately placed equally-weighted S&P 500 
fund in 1971 (which apparently never caught on), and introduced a value-weighted fund 
in 1973.
21  Black and Scholes describe the challenges in bringing this product to market, 
which required Wells Fargo to navigate regulatory and tax issues, surmount systems 
processing requirements, and educate potential investors.  What were the stimuli for these 
innovations? At one level, the introduction of index funds permitted investors to better 
manage their investment-consumption decisions—they “completed the market.” They 
also were an economical solution to high transaction costs which would prevent most 
investors from creating a basket of securities that replicated the entire equity market.  We 
must also acknowledge that the innovation was shaped by new technologies (both 
intellectual advancements as well as systems capabilities), was a response to tax and 
regulatory factors, and was driven by the presence of information asymmetries and 
transaction costs that made trading costly.  Thus, this one innovation was the result of 
virtually every explanation advanced above.  Attempts to distinguish which factor was 
most important seems pointless. 24 
Later generations of indexed products (and futures contracts) followed, but 
moving ahead a later related development was exchange traded funds (EFT).  EFTs 
essentially let investors trade the market index throughout the day.
22 Toronto Index 
Participations (TIPS) in 1990 , Leland O’Brian Rubinstein’s SuperTrust in 1992, the 
American Stock Exchange’s SPDRs (Standard and Poor’s Depository Receipts) in 1993, 
and Merrill Lynch’s HOLDRs in 1999  were steps in the evolutionary innovation process. 
Arguably, EFTs and HOLDRs were motivated by similar impulses as the index funds, 
but these innovations enhance the functionality of the original innovation.  They permit 
investors to enjoy even lower transaction costs than many index funds and permit 
intraday trading, which facilitates speculation, arbitrage and risk management.  These 
innovations are driven by regulation, in that they permit investors to short sell the index, 
which index funds do not, and avoid the uptick rule, which prescribes when an investor 
can short-sell a security.   These products are also tax-motivated, in that they permit 
investors to avoid potential tax liabilities resulting from the redemptions of other 
investors, and to “cherry pick” the timing of recognition of losses and gains on individual 
securities in the basket.   The HOLDRS also reduce transaction costs by eliminating 
rebalancing, whose transaction costs (due to recognition of capital gains) can be 
material.
23 
  The newest “generation” of products pushing this functionality to even greater 
levels are the “personal funds” that a few web-based firms are offering, such as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
21 Vanguard’s retail offering, the First Index Investment Trust, was introduced  in 1976. 
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legal form, have different settling up features, and are not permissible investments for some investors.  The 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange first offered a futures contract on the S&P 500 index in 1982. 
23 For historical background on these products, see Gary Gastineu, “Exchange Traded Funds: An 
Introduction” Institutional Investor, Spring 2001.  Also see the case studies of SuperTrust (Mason, Merton, 
Perold and Tufano (1995) and HOLDRS  (Perold and Brown (2000)). 25 
folioFN.
24   These firms permit investors to assemble baskets of stock in relatively small 
denominations, allowing investors to create and trade positions involving fractional 
shares.   Like ETFs, these products permit investors to assemble and trade baskets as well 
as enjoy certain tax timing advantages while eliminating the overhang of capital gains 
triggered by mutual fund redemptions.  This innovation takes us back to the days before 
the first “market portfolio” in that it makes it possible for investors to directly create the 
exposures that index funds and EFTS made possible.   What accounts for this new 
innovation?  At a functional level, this product represents another step in the line of 
products that enable investors to hold broad diversified baskets for consumption 
smoothing, risk management and speculation.  Yet it is technology, embedded in 
improvements in information technologies, that permit personal funds to be technically 
feasible.  Technology may enable these innovators to market these products via the web 
as well as execute transactions at low costs.  One report noted that “It simply was 
impossible to consider such a strategy before the advent of the Internet, ‘This firm is a 
child of the Internet, [the founder] said.”   
  Market funds, index funds, ETFs, HOLDRs, personal funds—this family of 
innovations embody just about every possible motive for innovation.  They all deliver a 
similar basic functionality, but successive innovations build upon each other.  Each new 
generation attempts to lower the costs of transacting, be more tax efficient, and to give 
investors increasing control over their decisions.   This mini-history is a quick reminder 
of the evolutionary process of innovation.  Along the way, some products died out (equal 
weighted market funds or SuperTrust), some succeeded (index funds and ETFs) and 
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some are too early to tell (personal funds.)  Individual innovations often fail, but even in 
their failure, they give subsequent innovators new information that can be used to 
develop the next generation of products.   
This evolutionary flavor reminds us that the innovation process is a dynamic one.  
Understanding these dynamics has been a long-standing topic among students of 
innovation, with research on patent races being well covered.
25  However, the easily 
imitated nature of financial innovation may not lend itself easily to these models.  Merton 
(1992) characterizes the dynamics of innovation in the financial service world using a 
metaphor of “financial innovation spiral” in which one innovation begets the next.  We 
see this in the sequence of innovations discussed above.  We also see the spiral when we 
consider that the trading of standardized exchange-traded products facilitates the creation 
of custom-designed OTC products, which in turn stimulates even greater trading, 
lowering transaction costs and making possible even more new products.    A variant of 
this concept would help explain how rival investment banks created a set of increasingly-
improved preferred stocks that would maintain a relatively constant principal values 
(Mason, Merton, Perold and Tufano (1995)), by copying and improving the prior product.   
Persons and Warther (1997) model the innovation spiral in which adoption of innovations 
provides other participants with information about the profitability of innovation, creating 
waves of innovation and an S-curve shape of adoption.     
 
4.   Who innovates?  The identities of and private returns to innovators 
As Allen (2001) points out, much of financial economics acts as if financial 
institutions do not exist.  While this tendency has also characterized some of the literature 27 
on financial innovation, given the fairly applied nature of the field, writers have more 
explicitly dealt with the role of private parties and financial intermediaries as innovators.  
Duffie and Jackson (1990) consider the incentives of exchanges which lead them to offer 
one new contract rather than another.  Ross (1988) explicitly incorporates a role for 
investment banks that maximize their own profits by coming up with innovative bundles 
of securities to lower marketing or search costs.  Boot and Thakor (1997) model how 
different institutional structures might lead to different levels of innovation.  They find 
that innovation would be lower in a universal banking system—especially one with 
substantial market concentration—than in one in which commercial and investment 
banking were functionally separated.  Essentially, greater competition among these 
private parties leads to increased innovation.   Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2000) model 
the incentives for innovation within the investment banking industry.  They find that 
banks with larger market shares will tend to innovate, as will banks whose clients are 
more sticky.  Heinonen (1992) studies game-theoretic models of innovation, focusing on 
benefits on the costs of production (economies of scope) or on the costs of distribution 
(marketing.) 
There has been relatively little empirical work on the benefits accruing to 
financial innovators.  Tufano (1989) and Carrow (1999) study the incentives of 
investment banks to innovate, focusing on the market shares they capture and the 
underwriting spreads they charge on new types of securities.  Both studies find that 
innovators earn higher market shares than followers, even though imitation is rapid.  The 
studies reach different conclusions about whether innovating investment banks charge 
higher underwriting spreads than do follower banks.  Tufano found that underwriting 
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spreads on the first offerings of innovations were not materially larger than those on later 
offerings, casting doubt on the notion that the primary profit from innovation comes from 
increased spreads.  Carrow re-examined this question a decade later with a slightly 
different sample, incorporating additional variables into this analysis (underwriter 
prestige rankings and 14 dummy variables indicating specific features of the security).  
With this new specification, he finds that as the number of rivals increases, spreads do 
indeed decline.  Neither of these studies looks at the many ways in which innovative 
bankers might profit by earning trading profits on aftermarket activities, increasing the 
likelihood of receiving subsequent business through enhanced reputation, increasing the 
quality of their own personnel leading to a higher quality staff, or more personally for the 
individuals involved, increasing their bonuses and career progression.  All of these 
mechanisms for rewarding innovation are open questions for future research.     
In some academic models, parties most constrained or inconvenienced by 
imperfections would be the most likely to innovate, as the shadow costs of releasing these 
constraints would be greatest for these firms.   Silber (1975, 1983) articulates this 
constraint-based notion of innovation.   This might suggest that the smallest, weakest 
firms, who face the most constraints, would be the most likely to innovate.  In the broad 
field of innovation, this seems to be the case, with smaller firms thought to be more 
innovative.
26  There is some anecdotal evidence that supports this conclusion in financial 
services.  Two upstart financial service firms—Vanguard and Drexel Burnham 
Lambert—substantially developed their businesses using a platform of innovative 
products (index funds and junk bonds), and a variety of e-Businesses attempted to create 
competitive advantage through innovation.  However, this anecdotal observation is not 29 
consistently supported by the empirical data.  At least for securities innovations, larger, 
more financially secure investment banks have consistently been the leading innovators 
(see Tufano (1989)).  Matthews (1994, chapter 13) adapts industrial organization models 
to show why there might be a self-reinforcing cycle between innovation and market 
share, with larger firms innovating and thereby increasing their size at the expense of 
their rivals.  It is probably fair to note that cross sectional determinants of the locus of 
financial innovation is still an eminently researchable question. 
Among issuers, it is difficult to argue that the most constrained firms are the most 
innovative.  Rather, a great deal of innovation is directed at larger, well-established firms, 
as described by one banker: 
The only way to reach large investment-grade companies is innovation. Such 
companies have ready access to every segment of the capital markets on attractive 
terms; we have to offer the better mousetrap.  This inevitably leads to an array of 
products, often customized for individual issues.
27 
 
Perhaps, smaller and weaker firms face a great number of constraints, and their efforts are 
focused on addressing these constraints directly (e.g., communicating their story to 
potential investors) rather than optimizing the form of capital.  Larger firms may have 
addressed these first-order imperfections and turn their attention to more nuanced capital 
structuring issues and innovations.  Among issuers, the question of which firms 
innovate—and why—remains an open one. 
Innovation includes not only invention, but also the processes of the diffusion or 
adoption of the adoption.  The diffusion of innovations has long been studied in the 
industrial organization field (Molyneux and Shamroukh (1999) summarize the industrial 
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feeds on persistent innovation,” Investment Dealers’ Digest, May 22, 2000. 30 
organizational literature on the adoption of innovations.)  Empirical studies of the 
adoption of financial innovations have focused on the introduction of automated teller 
machines (Hannan and McDowell (1984, 1987) and Saloner and Shepherd (1995)), small 
business credit scoring (Akhavein, Frame and White (2001)), patents (Lerner (2002)), 
off-balance sheet activities of banks (Molyneux and Shamroukh (1996), Obay (2000)), 
junk bond issuance (Molyneux and Shamroukh (1999)) and corporate security 
innovations (Tufano (1989)).  The central question in much of this literature is to 
determine which organizations adopt innovations and how quickly they do so.  While this 
literature is rich, much of it plays off of the question of whether larger firms or smaller 
firms lead innovation, a long-standing debate.  There is also a “sociological” aspect to 
this research, in that it tries to understand the relative importance of external stimuli 
versus internal factors (organizational characteristics and competitive interactions among 
potential adopters.)   In many of these studies, it has been the larger firms that have 
innovated more rapidly, for example, with larger banks more quick to adopt credit 
scoring or larger investment banks are faster to underwrite new securities.       
Bringing new securities to market requires the voluntary cooperation of both 
issuers and investors. As a business proposition, innovation surely has the potential to 
enable businesses to create value.  This is the theme in a business book, The Power of 
Financial Innovation, by Geanuracos and Millar (1991), which studies 75 firms around 
the globe, showing “how the world’s best-managed companies are …putting the latest 
instruments to effective use.”  While it is surely the case that some businesses will use 
innovation and profit, there is little systematic evidence on the benefits enjoyed by 
investors and issuers, and how they share any benefits of innovation.  Preliminary 31 
evidence suggest that innovative investors in the 1970s and 1980s apparently endured 
greater risk than later investors (measured by variability of ex post holding period 
returns) and earned slightly higher returns for bearing these additional risks.  However, 
whether the extra return is appropriate for the level of extra risk borne is difficult to 
ascertain in a small sample.
28   
There are a series of clinical studies of individual innovations that look at the 
wealth impacts of innovations.  Nanda and Yul (1996) study poison puts in convertible 
bonds, and conclude that shareholders benefited form this innovation, perhaps at the 
expense of bondholders.  Rogalski and Seward (1991) study foreign exchange currency 
warrants and find that their issuers apparently benefited from this innovation, although 
they find that investors substantially overpayed for this innovation.   Jarrow and O’Hara 
(1989) find that purchasers and Primes and Scores apparently overpaid for these products 
relative to the price of the stocks from which they were constructed.  Jarrow and O’Hara 
note however that these products can serve valuable hedging demands for investors, and 
in the presence of transaction costs may have benefited all parties.   
As a general proposition, we have a great deal more to learn about the pricing of 
financial innovations and how benefits, if any, are shared among participants.    This is a 
long standing research topic in industrial organization; see Tirole (1988, Chapter 10) for a 
discussion of the appropriation of the returns to innovation. 
 
5.   The impact of financial innovation on society 
While most authors acknowledge that innovation has both positive and negative 
impacts on society, their conclusion regarding the net impact of financial innovation 
                                                           
28 See Tufano (1996). 32 
reflects a diversity of opinions. Merton (1992) stakes out one side of the argument: 
“Financial innovation is viewed as the “engine” driving the financial system towards its 
goal of improving the performance of what economists call the “real economy.”  Merton 
cites the U.S. national mortgage market, the development of international markets for 
financial derivatives and the growth of the mutual fund and investment industries as 
examples where innovation has produced enormous social welfare gains.   
Others take the opposite viewpoint, sometimes employing literary license (and 
movie metaphors) to make the argument that innovation’s benefits are less clear: 
Nothing is more dangerous than a good idea.  That ominous generalization seems 
inescapable given the development of finance over the past 40 years.  Time and 
again, business has seized upon a new idea—junk bonds, LBOs, derivatives—
only to push it far past its sensible application to a seemingly inevitable disaster.  




The phrase “financial engineer” suggests another profession, that of genetic 
engineer.  Indeed, one legal scholar invoked the vision of derivatives inhabiting a 
financial Jurassic Park with the implication that financial engineers have the 




  How do we research the question of the net social benefits of innovation?  One 
“methodology” in the literature extrapolates from specific examples, like the mortgage 
market.  For any one innovation, one can attempt to measure the impact of innovation.  
For example, researchers have attempted to measure the size of the gains from financial 
innovation in the mortgage market in the form of securitization. and unbundling through 
the creation of collateralized mortgage obligations or CMOs.  These papers conclude that 
innovation led to materially lower mortgage rates charged to borrowers.  See Hendershott 
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and Shilling (1989), Sirmans and Benjamin (1990) and Jameson, Dewan and Sirmans 
(1992).  However, others are quick to identify contrary examples—the legal and policy 
literature has extended discussions of the “costs” of innovation that defer and evade 
taxation, giving rise to loss of tax revenues, loss of confidence in government, a sense of 
inequity, and extensive resources devoted to this activity which does not enhance social 
welfare.  There are other arguments that innovation leads to complexity that in turn leads 
to bad business decisions and social costs.      
  One sustained attack on financial innovation is that specific innovations 
contribute to high levels of market volatility, and in particular, to outcomes like market 
crashes.   For example, supporters of this argument point to examples like the impact of 
portfolio insurance trading on the stock market crash of 1987.  Merton Miller’s (1991) 
book, Financial Innovations and Market Volatility, is a sustained rebuttal to this 
argument.  Miller refutes the contention that innovations have increased market volatility 
and then argues strongly that attempts to regulate innovation will be counterproductive, 
like those of King Canute trying to control the tides.    The derivatives market has been 
the site of battles between those who see innovation as a good or bad influence on social 
welfare.   These discussions can quickly turn to very specific questions, such as “Do 
derivatives exacerbate emerging market crises?”
31 
Despite the best intentions of the authors on either side of these arguments, their 
studies cannot measure social welfare directly, nor can they benchmark the observed 
outcomes against those never observed.  Furthermore, in light of the innovation spiral 
(where successful innovations beget others) and the evolutionary process (where many 
                                                                                                                                                                             
but contrasted it with another image—of innovation permitting firms to hedge, producing “soothing, perfect 
hedges found in formal gardens.” 34 
innovations fail), it is exceedingly difficult to identify the boundaries of a particular 
innovation, if one wanted to measure its costs.  
  Looking at the ex post impacts of specific financial innovations to judge whether 
the ex ante existence of an innovative financial system is a hopeless task.  Seeking 
another way to approach the ex ante question, theorists have weighed into the discussion 
of the social welfare implications of financial innovation.   In order to bring enough 
structure to the problem so as permit a meaningful discussion, they tend to focus on one 
particular aspect of innovation.  Theorists studying the role of innovation in completing 
or spanning markets have made the most progress, and the surveys by Allen and Gale 
(1994) and Duffie and Rahi (1995) summarize the literature.  Given that markets are 
incomplete, one might assume that innovation that gives participants greater freedom of 
choice (in terms of spanning) would enhance social welfare almost by definition, in the 
sense of being pareto-optimal.  Unfortunately, this is not the case.  For example, Elul 
(1995) studies the welfare effects of financial innovation in incomplete markets.  Elul 
shows that the addition of a new security may have “almost arbitrary effects on agents’ 
utilities.”  The introduction of a new security can “generically make all agents strictly 
worse off, or all agents strictly better off, or favor any group of agents over another.”    
Allen and Gale’s (1994) comprehensive book puts together a set of their papers—
but taken together, the results are discomforting.  In a series of papers, they analyze the 
impact of short sale constraints on social welfare.  In their 1988 paper, they show that if 
short selling is severely limited, innovation may enhance social welfare and is efficient.  
However, in their 1991 piece, in which they study the environment in which investors are 
allowed to undertake unlimited short sales, they find that financial innovation is not 
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necessarily efficient. (Allen and Gale conclude that with unlimited short sales, even the 
concept of equilibrium is ill defined.)  There are many more papers (see the reviews by 
Allen and Gale (1994) and Duffie and Rahi (1995)), but it is probably fair to say that the 
existing theoretical models are sufficiently stylized and sufficiently fragile so as to not 
permit sweeping generalizations to be made regarding the social welfare implications of 
financial innovation.  This too remains an open issue in the literature.  There may be an 
opportunity to apply advanced techniques from the “new” Industrial Organization 
literature to estimate supply and demand curves to estimate the social welfare impacts of 
financial innovation—if the necessary data can be found. 
      
6.  Issues on the horizon: patenting and intellectual property 
In most businesses, innovators protect their property rights in a variety of ways:  
They can try to maintain their innovations as trade secrets, as Coca-Cola has done with its 
famous recipe.  They can patent their inventions, and then license them to partners or to 
litigate to discourage infringement. They can attach proprietary labels (copyrights, 
trademarks or servicemarks) to them, thereby branding them.   They can attempt to 
capture first mover advantages—in the form of higher prices or greater market shares—
by virtue of their innovation.  
While financial innovators do put service marks on their products and benefit 
from some first mover advantages, the extent of financial innovation has been a bit of an 
intellectual property puzzle, because both trade secrecy and patenting were thought to be 
impossible means of protection.  Secrecy is difficult for innovative securities, as investors 
and regulators typically demand disclosure of the terms of the offering.  Secrecy is 36 
possible to a greater degree to protect process-innovations, such as the pricing algorithms 
for exotic derivatives or information processing systems that would control the creation 
of new  pooled security vehicles, such as collateralized products or personalized baskets 
of stocks.  Patenting was considered infeasible, because the U.S. Patent Office had 
historically taken a dim view of the patentability of most financial products.  While there 
had been a few exceptions (e.g., Merrill Lynch’s early patent on its process for Cash 
Management Accounts), financial innovations were considered “business processes” 
which were hard to patent. 
However, in 1998, Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the case of State 
Street Bank v. Signature Financial 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998) seemed 
to open the door for patents on financial products.  Signature had developed a system for 
asset management that it called the Hub-and-Spokes system, in which a centrally-
managed master fund (the hub) was distributed in a variety of institutionally-distinct 
forms (the spokes).  Signature patented this system, and then sued State Street for using 
it.  The Court of Appeals upheld Signature’s patent, which was considered by some to be 
a watershed event in financial innovation, providing innovators with new means to 
protect their intellectual property. For a discussion, see Heaton (2000). 
It is unclear whether the State Street decision will be construed narrowly or 
broadly, or whether it will have a substantial impact on business activity.  However, as 
with any new development, this one is likely to invite additional research.  Lerner (2002) 
has given us a first glimpse of the new phenomenon of financial patents, demonstrating 
the substantial increase in patenting activity, the failure of finance patents to give proper 
attribution to prior art, and the failure of many firms, individuals and universities to seek 37 
protection for their ideas.   The interested reader can browse the current set of 
applications and grants at www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html.  Finance-related patents are 
being filed for a wide range of new products and processes, ranging from patents on 
Monte Carlo valuation methods to “prepayment wristbands and computer debit systems.”  
There is understandably some factual and legal disagreement over the validity of 
individual patents, in particular over the novelty of some of the patents in light of the 
substantial amount of prior (non-patented) prior art. 
Academic research could help to understand whether patenting will encourage or 
discourage innovation, change the nature of financial innovation, encourage more 
innovation by smaller players, or change the competitive/cooperative interactions among 
financial service firms.  In part, this yet-to-be completed work will simply build upon the 
extensive body of work in the industrial organization field on patenting.  However, trying 
to understand what—if anything—is different about the financial services industry, and 
the implications for protection of intellection property and the nature of competition, is 
likely to be a fertile area for future work. 
 
7.   Summary 
The activity of financial innovation is large, but the literature on the topic is 
relatively small and spread out broadly among a number of fields.  Unlike some other 
areas represented in this volume, where our profession had made a great deal of progress, 
the subject of financial innovation remains one in which our intellectual maps show vast 
uncharted—and potentially interesting—lands to be explored. 38 
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